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Incompletely Theorized Agreements in  
Constitutional Law 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
Abstract 
 
How is constitutionalism possible, when people disagree on so many questions 
about what is good and what is right? This essay, written for a special issue of Social 
Research on Difficult Decisions, explores the role of two kinds of incompletely theorized 
agreements amidst sharp disagreements about the largest issues in social life. The first 
consist of agreements on abstract formulations (freedom of speech, equality under the 
law); these agreements are crucial to constitution-making as a social practice. The 
second consist of agreements on particular doctrines and practices; these agreements 
are crucial to life and law under existing constitutions. Incompletely theorized 
agreements help illuminate an enduring constitutional puzzle: how members of diverse 
societies can work together on terms of mutual respect amidst intense disagreements 
about both the right and the good. Such agreements help make constitutions and 
constitutional law possible, even within nations whose citizens cannot concur on the most 
fundamental matters. 
 
 
 In many nations, citizens must proceed in the face of conflict and disagreement on 
the most fundamental matters. The existence of diverse values seems to threaten the very 
possibility of a constitutional order and social stability. People disagree on rights, on the 
good life, on equality and liberty, on the nature and the existence of God. How can 
constitutional decisions be feasible in these circumstances? The problem might seem 
especially serious for democratic societies, which aspire to self-governance amidst a 
great deal of heterogeneity. In this essay I deal with two issues—constitution-making and 
constitutional interpretation—in an effort to make some progress on that question. 
 My basic suggestion is that people can often agree on constitutional practices, and 
even on constitutional rights, when they cannot agree on constitutional theories. In other 
words, well-functioning constitutional orders try to solve problems through incompletely 
theorized agreements. Sometimes these agreements involve abstractions, accepted as 
such amidst severe disagreements on particular cases. Thus people who disagree on 
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incitement to violence and hate speech can accept a general free speech principle, and 
those who argue about same-sex relationships can accept an abstract antidiscrimination 
principle. This is an important phenomenon in constitutional law and politics; it makes 
constitution-making possible. Constitution-makers can agree on abstractions without 
agreeing on the particular meaning of those abstractions.  
But sometimes incompletely theorized agreements involve concrete outcomes 
rather than abstractions. In hard cases, people can agree that a certain practice is 
constitutional, or is not constitutional, even when the theories that underlie their 
judgments sharply diverge. In the day-to-day operation of constitutional practice, 
incompletely theorized agreements on certain rules and doctrines help to ensure a sense 
of what the law is, even amidst large-scale disagreements about what, particularly, 
accounts for those rules and doctrines. 
This latter phenomenon suggests a general strategy for handling some of the most 
difficult decisions. When people disagree or are uncertain about an abstract issue—is 
equality more important than liberty? does free will exist? is utilitarianism right? does 
punishment have retributive aims?—they can often make progress by moving to a level 
of greater particularity. They attempt a conceptual descent. This phenomenon has an 
especially notable feature: It enlists silence, on certain basic questions, as a device for 
producing convergence despite disagreement, uncertainty, limits of time and capacity, 
and heterogeneity. In short, silence can be a constructive force. Incompletely theorized 
agreements are an important source of successful constitutionalism and social stability; 
they also provide a way for people to demonstrate mutual respect. 
 Consider some examples. People may believe that it is important to protect 
religious liberty while having quite diverse theories about why this is so. Some people 
may stress what they see as the need for social peace; others may think that religious 
liberty reflects a principle of equality and a recognition of human dignity; others may 
invoke utilitarian considerations; still others may think that religious liberty is itself a 
theological command. Similarly, people may invoke many different grounds for their 
shared belief that the Constitution should ensure an independent judiciary. Some may 
think that judicial independence helps ensure against tyranny; others may think that it 
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makes government more democratic; still others may think that it leads to greater 
efficiency in economic terms. 
 The agreement on particulars is incompletely theorized in the sense that the 
relevant participants are clear on the practice or the result without agreeing on the most 
general theory that accounts for it. Often people can agree that a rule—protecting 
political dissenters, allowing workers to practice their religion—makes sense without 
entirely agreeing on the foundations of their belief. They may accept an outcome—
affirming the right to marry for heterosexual couples, protecting sexually explicit art, 
banning racial segregation—without understanding or converging on an ultimate ground 
for that acceptance. Often people can agree not merely on the outcome, but also on a 
rationale offering low-level or mid-level principles on its behalf. But what ultimately 
accounts for the outcome, in terms of a full-scale theory of the right or the good, is left 
unexplained.  
 There is an extreme case of incomplete theorization, offered when disagreement 
is especially intense: full particularity. This phenomenon occurs when people agree on a 
result without agreeing on any kind of supporting rationale. They announce what they 
want to do without offering a reason for doing it. Any rationale—any reason—is by 
definition more abstract than the result that it supports. Sometimes people do not offer 
reasons at all, because they do not know what those reasons are, or because they cannot 
agree on reasons, or because they fear that the reasons that they have would turn out, on 
reflection, to be inadequate and hence to be misused in the future. This is an important 
phenomenon in Anglo-American law. Juries usually do not offer reasons for outcomes, 
and negotiators sometimes conclude that something should happen without saying why it 
should happen. I will not emphasize this limiting case here, and shall focus instead on 
outcomes accompanied by low-level or mid-level principles. 
 My emphasis on incompletely theorized agreements is intended partly as 
descriptive. These agreements are a pervasive phenomenon in constitution-making and 
constitutional law. Such agreements are crucial to the effort to make effective decisions 
amidst intense disagreement. But I mean to make some points about constitutionalism 
amidst pluralism as well. In short, there are special virtues to avoiding large-scale 
theoretical conflicts. Incompletely theorized agreements can operate as foundations for 
both rules and analogies, and such agreements are especially well-suited to the limits of 
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many diverse institutions, including legislators and courts. Incompletely theorized 
agreements have their place in the private sector as well. They can be found on university 
faculties, in the workplace, and even within families. At the same time, there are many 
puzzles about the limits of incomplete theorization, and about the relationship between 
incomplete theorization and self-consciously traditionalist approaches to constitutional 
law and social life in general. 
 
How People Converge 
 
 It seems clear that outside of law, people may agree on a correct outcome even 
though they do not have a theory to account for their judgments. You may know that 
dropped objects fall, that bee stings hurt, that hot air rises, and that snow melts, without 
knowing exactly why these facts are true. The same is true for morality, both in general 
and insofar as it bears on constitutional law. You may know that slavery is wrong, that 
government may not stop political protests, that every person should have just one vote, 
and that it is bad for government to take your land unless it pays for it, without knowing 
exactly or entirely why these things are so. Moral judgments may be right or true even if 
they are reached by people who lack a full account of those judgments (though moral 
reasoners may well do better if they try to offer such an account, a point to which I will 
return). The same is true for law, constitutional and otherwise. A judge may know that if 
government punishes religious behavior, it has acted unlawfully, without having a full 
account of why this principle has been accepted as law. We may thus offer an 
epistemological point: People can know that X is true without entirely knowing why X is 
true.  
 There is a political point as well. Sometimes people can agree on individual 
judgments even if they disagree on general theory. In American constitutional law, for 
example, diverse judges may agree that Roe v. Wade,
1
 protecting the right to choose 
abortion, should not be overruled, though the reasons that lead each of them to that 
conclusion sharply diverge. Some people think that the Court should respect its own 
precedents; others think that Roe was rightly decided as a way of protecting women’s 
equality; others think that the case was rightly decided as a way of protecting privacy; 
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others think that the decision reflects an appropriate judgment about the social role of 
religion; still others think that restrictions on abortion are unlikely to protect fetuses in 
the world, and so the decision is good for pragmatic or consequentialist reasons. We can 
find incompletely theorized political agreements on particular outcomes in many areas of 
law and politics—on both sides of disputes over national security, on both sides of 
disputes discrimination controversies, both sides of disputes over criminal justice, both 
sides of disputes over taxation.  
Within the United States, there are incompletely theorized agreements within the 
Republican party and among Republican-appointed judges. There are similar agreements 
within the Democratic party and among Democratic-appointed judges. Political parties 
are held together by incomplete theorization; when such parties fracture, or fall apart, it is 
sometimes because theorization must become more complete. Some of the most 
interesting of incompletely theorized agreements can be found not within but across the 
parties. In the United States, Republicans and Democrats agree on a great deal, not 
necessarily because they accept the same foundational commitments, but because diverse 
commitments can converge on the same practices and even principles. 
 
Rules and Analogies 
 
 Rules and analogies are the two most important methods for resolving 
constitutional disputes without obtaining agreement on fundamental principles. Both of 
these devices—keys to public law in many nations—attempt to promote a major goal of a 
heterogeneous society: to make it possible to obtain agreement where agreement is 
necessary, and to make it unnecessary to obtain agreement where agreement is 
impossible.  
 People can often agree on what constitutional rules are even when they agree on 
very little else. Their substantive disagreements, however intense, are usually irrelevant 
to their judgments about the meaning and the binding quality of those rules.
2
 And in the 
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face of persistent disagreement or uncertainty about what justice and morality require, 
people can reason about particular constitutional cases by reference to analogies. They 
point to cases in which the legal judgments are firm. They proceed from those firm 
judgments to the more difficult ones. In fact this is how ordinary people tend to think.
 We might consider in this regard Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer’s 
discussion of one of the key compromises reached by the seven members of the United 
States Sentencing Commission.
3
 As Breyer describes it, a central issue was how to 
proceed in the face of highly disparate philosophical premises about the goals of criminal 
punishment. Some people asked the Commission to follow an approach to punishment 
based on “just deserts”—an approach that would rank criminal conduct in terms of 
severity. But different commissioners had very different views about how different 
crimes should be ranked. In these circumstances, Justice Breyer reports, there could be an 
odd form of deliberation in which criminal punishments became ever more and more 
irrationally severe, because some commissioners would insist that the crime under 
consideration was worse than the previously ranked crimes. In any case agreement on a 
rational system would be unlikely to follow from efforts by the seven commissioners to 
rank crimes in terms of severity.  
 Other people urged the Commission to use a model of deterrence. There were, 
however, major problems with this approach. No good empirical evidence links all 
possible variations in punishment to prevention of crime. In any case, the seven members 
of the Commission were highly unlikely to agree that deterrence provides an adequate 
account of the aims of criminal sentencing. To many people, it is controversial to suggest 
that deterrence is the sole or even principal goal of punishment. An approach based on 
deterrence seemed no better than an approach based on just deserts. 
 In these circumstances, what route did the Commission follow? In fact the 
Commission abandoned large theories altogether. It adopted no general view about the 
appropriate aims of criminal sentencing. Instead the Commission abandoned high theory 
and adopted a rule—one founded on precedent: “It decided to base the Guidelines 
primarily upon typical, or average, actual past practice.” Consciously articulated 
explanations, not based on high theory, were used to support particular departures from 
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the past. The decision to adopt this approach must have been based on a belief that the 
typical or average practice contained sense rather than nonsense – a belief that can be 
supported by reference to the frequent “wisdom of crowds.”
4
 
 Justice Breyer sees this effort as a necessary means of obtaining agreement and 
rationality within a diverse, multimember body charged with avoiding unjustifiably wide 
variations in sentencing. Thus his more colorful oral presentation: “Why didn’t the 
Commission sit down and really go and rationalize this thing and not just take history? 
The short answer to that is: we couldn’t. We couldn’t because there are such good 
arguments all over the place pointing in opposite directions. . . . Try listing all the crimes 
that there are in rank order of punishable merit . . . Then collect results from your friends 
and see if they all match. I will tell you they don’t.”
5
 
 The example suggests a more general point. Through both analogies and rules, it 
is often possible for participants in constitutional law to converge on both abstract 
principles and particular outcomes without resolving large-scale issues of the right or the 
good. Indeed, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was produced through a 
process akin to that described by Justice Breyer, with a refusal to engage high theory and 
instead an effort to build on widespread understandings.
6
 The basic enterprise operated 
by surveying the behavior of most nations, and by building a “universal declaration” on 
the basis of shared practices. A philosophers’ group, involved in the project, “began its 
work by sending a questionnaire to statesmen and scholars around the world.”
7
  
 At a key stage, the people involved in drafting the declaration produced “a list of 
forty-eight items that represented ... the common core of” a wide range of documents and 
proposals, including judgments from “Arabic, British, Canadian, Chinese, French, pre-
Nazi German, Italian, Latin American, Polish, Soviet Russian and Spanish” nations and 
cultures.
8
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights emerged from this process. Thus 
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Jacques Maritain, a philosopher closely involved in the Universal Declaration, famously 
said, “Yes, we agree about the rights, but on condition no one asks us why.”
9
 The general 
point is that a judgment in favor of a set of rights can emerge across disagreement or 
uncertainty about the foundations of those rights. 
 
Features of Analogy 
 
 Analogical thinking is pervasive in law and in everyday life. In ordinary 
discussions of political and legal questions, people proceed not by reference to first 
principles or ambitious theories but analogically. You think that racial hate speech is not 
protected by the first amendment; does this mean that government can silence political 
extremists? A familiar argumentative technique is to show inconsistency between 
someone’s claim about case X in light of their views on case Y. The goal is to reveal 
hypocrisy or confusion, or to force the claimant to show how the apparently deep 
commitment on the case about which the discussants agree can be squared with the 
claimant’s view about a case on which they disagree. 
 In analogical thinking as I understand it here, deep theories about the good or the 
right are not deployed. In constitutional law, such theories are not usually invoked on 
behalf of one or another result. On the other hand, analogizers cannot possibly reason 
from one particular to another particular without saying something at least a little 
abstract.
10
 They must invoke a reason of principle or policy to the effect that case A was 
decided rightly for a reason, and they must say that that reason applies, or does not apply, 
in case B. This method of proceeding is ideally suited to a legal system consisting of 
numerous judges who disagree on first principles and who must take most decided cases 
as fixed points from which to proceed. For the same reason, those outside of law often 
think analogically in difficult cases.Consider some examples. We know that an employer 
may not fire an employee for agreeing to perform jury duty; it is said to “follow” that an 
employer is banned from firing an employee for refusing to commit perjury. Turning to a 
constitutional issue, we know that a speech by a member of the Ku Klux Klan, 
advocating racial hatred, cannot be regulated unless it is likely to incite and directed to 
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inciting imminent lawless action
11
; it is said to follow that the government cannot forbid 
members of the Nazi Party to march in Skokie, Illinois. We know that there is no 
constitutional right to welfare, medical care, or housing
12
; it is said to follow that there is 
no constitutional right to government protection against domestic violence. 
 From a brief glance at these cases, we can get a sense of the characteristic form of 
analogical thought in law. The process appears to work in five simple steps. (1) Some 
fact pattern A—the “source” case—has certain characteristics; call them X, Y, and Z. (2) 
Fact pattern B—the “target” case—has characteristic X, Y, and A, or characteristics X, 
Y, Z, and A. (3) A is treated a certain way in law. (4) Some principle, created or 
discovered in the process of thinking through A, B, and their interrelations, explains why 
A is treated the way that it is. (5) Because of what it shares in common with A, B should 
be treated the same way. It is covered by the same principle.  
 Some people think that analogical reasoning is really a form of deduction; but this 
is a mistake. To be sure, analogical reasoning cannot proceed without identification of a 
governing idea—a principle, a standard, or a rule—to account for the results in the source 
and target cases. This is the crucial step (4) above. But the governing idea is not given in 
advance and applied to the new case. Instead analogical reasoning helps identify the 
governing idea and is indispensable to its acceptance; we do not know what the idea is 
until we have assessed the cases. Analogy and disanalogy are created or discovered 
through the process of comparing cases, as people discern a principle that makes sense of 
their considered judgments. They did not know, in advance, to what principle they might 
become committed. In this sense, there is a relationship between analogical reasoning, as 
it operates in law, and Rawls’ understanding of the search for reflective equilibrium.
13
  
 Analogical reasoning in constitutional law usually operates without anything like 
a deep or comprehensive theory that would account for the particular outcomes it yields. 
The judgments that underlie convictions about the relevant case are incompletely 
theorized. Of course there is a continuum from the most particularistic and low-level 
principles to the deepest and most general. It is also true that those engaged in analogical 
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reasoning might have to be more ambitious than they like in order to think well about 
hard cases. I suggest only that analogizers in constitutional law try to avoid those 
approaches that come close to the deeply theorized or the foundational. Agreement 
amidst heterogeneity is possible for that reason. 
 It might be asked at this point: Why is agreement so important, in 
constitutionalism or elsewhere? The fact that people can obtain an agreement of this 
sort—about the value and meaning of a right or about the existence of a sound analogy—
is no guarantee of a good outcome. Perhaps the Sentencing Commission incorporated 
judgments that were based on ignorance, confusion, or prejudice. Some of the same 
things can be said about analogies. People in positions of authority may agree that a ban 
on same-sex marriages is constitutionally acceptable, because it is analogous to a ban on 
marriages between uncles and nieces; but the analogy may be misconceived, because 
there are relevant differences between the two cases, and because the similarities are far 
from decisive. The fact that people agree that some constitutional case A is analogous to 
case B does not mean that case A or case B is rightly decided. Perhaps case A should not 
be taken for granted. Perhaps case A should not be selected as the relevant foundation for 
analogical thinking; perhaps case Z is more pertinent. Perhaps case B is not really like 
case A. Problems with analogies and low-level thinking might lead us to be more 
ambitious. We may well be pushed in the direction of general theory—and toward 
broader and perhaps more controversial claims—precisely because analogical reasoners 
offer an inadequate and incompletely theorized account of relevant similarities or 
relevant differences. 
 All this should be sufficient to show that the virtues of decisions by rule and by 
analogy are partial. But no system of politics and law is likely to be either just or efficient 
if it dispenses with rules and analogies. In fact it is not likely even to be feasible.  
 
Constitutions, Cases, and Incompletely Theorized Agreements  
 
 Incompletely theorized agreements play a pervasive role in constitutional law and 
in society generally. It is quite rare for a person or group completely to theorize any 
subject, that is, to accept both a general theory and a series of steps connecting that 
theory to concrete conclusions. Thus we often have an incompletely theorized agreement 
on a general principle—incompletely theorized in the sense that people who accept the 
11 
principle need not agree on what it entails in particular cases. This is the sense 
emphasized by American Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his great 
aphorism, “General principles do not decide concrete cases.”
14
 The agreement is 
incompletely theorized in the sense that it is incompletely specified. Much of the key 
work must be done by others, often through case-by-case judgments, specifying the 
abstraction at the point of application. 
 Consider the cases of Poland, Iraq, and South Africa, where constitutional 
provisions include many abstract provisions on whose concrete specification there has 
been sharp dispute. Constitutional provisions usually protect such rights as “freedom of 
speech,” “religious liberty,” and “equality under the law,” and citizens agree on those 
abstractions in the midst of sharp dispute about what these provisions really entail. Much 
lawmaking also becomes possible only because of this phenomenon. And when 
agreement on a written constitution is difficult or impossible, it is because it is hard to 
obtain consensus on the governing abstractions. Consider the case of Israel, which lacks a 
written constitution because citizens have been unable to agree about basic principles, 
even if they are pitched at a high level of abstraction. 
 Observers of democratic constitutionalism might place particular emphasis on a 
different kind of phenomenon, of special interest for constitutional law in courts: 
incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes, accompanied by agreements 
on the narrow or low-level principles that account for them. There is no algorithm by 
which to distinguish between a high-level theory and one that operates at an intermediate 
or lower level. We might consider, as conspicuous examples of high-level theories, 
Kantianism and utilitarianism, and see illustrations in the many distinguished (academic) 
efforts to understand such areas as tort law, contract law, free speech, and the law of 
equality as undergirded by highly abstract theories of the right or the good. By contrast, 
we might think of low-level principles as including most of the ordinary material of low-
level constitutional justification or constitutional “doctrine”—the general class of 
principles and justifications that courts tend to offer. These principles and justifications 
are not said to derive from any particular large theories of the right or the good, have 
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ambiguous relations to large theories, and are compatible with more than one such 
theory.  
 By the term “low-level principles,” I refer to something relative, not absolute; I 
mean to do the same thing with the terms “theories” and “abstractions” (which I use 
interchangeably). In this setting, the notions “low-level,” “high,” and “abstract” are best 
understood in comparative terms, like the terms “big” and “old” and “unusual.” Thus the 
“clear and present danger” standard for regulation of speech in American law is a relative 
abstraction when compared with the claim that government may not stop a terrorist’s 
speech counseling violence on the Internet, or that members of the Nazi Party may march 
in Skokie, Illinois. But the “clear and present danger” idea is relatively particular when 
compared with the claim that nations should adopt the constitutional abstraction 
“freedom of speech.” The term “freedom of speech” is a relative abstraction when 
measured against the claim that campaign finance laws are acceptable, but the same term 
is less abstract than the grounds that justify free speech, as in, for example, the principle 
of personal autonomy or the idea of an unrestricted marketplace of ideas.  
 In analogical reasoning, this phenomenon occurs all the time. In the law of 
discrimination, for example, many people think that sex discrimination is “like” race 
discrimination, and should be treated similarly, even if they lack or cannot agree on a 
general theory of when discrimination is unacceptable. In the law of free speech, many 
people agree that a ban on speech by a Communist or a terrorist is “like” a ban on speech 
by a member of a fascist political party, and should be treated similarly—even if they 
lack or cannot agree on a general theory about the foundations of the free speech 
principle. 
 
Incomplete Theorization and the Constructive Uses of Silence 
 
 What might be said on behalf of incompletely theorized agreements about the 
content of a Constitution, or incompletely theorized judgments about particular 
constitutional cases? Some people think of incomplete theorization as quite 
unfortunate—as embarrassing, or reflective of some important problem, or a failure of 
nerve, or even philistine. When people theorize, by raising the level of abstraction, they 
do so to reveal bias, or confusion, or inconsistency. Surely participants in politics and 
constitutional law should not abandon this effort. 
13 
 There is important truth in these usual thoughts; it would not be sensible to 
celebrate theoretical modesty at all times and in all contexts. Sometimes participants in 
constitutional law and politics have sufficient information, and sufficient agreement, to 
be very ambitious. Sometimes they have to reason ambitiously in order to resolve cases. 
To the extent that the theoretical capacities of judges, or others, are infallible, theoretical 
ambition seems like nothing to lament. But judges are hardly infallible, and incompletely 
theorized judgments are an important and valuable part of both private and public life. 
They help make constitutions and constitutional law possible; they even help make social 
life possible. Silence—on something that may prove false, obtuse, or excessively 
contentious—can help minimize conflict, allow the present to learn from the future, and 
save a great deal of time and expense. What is said and resolved may be no more 
important than what is left out. There are four points here. 
 The first and most obvious point is that incompletely theorized agreements about 
constitutional principles and cases may be necessary for social stability. They are well-
suited to a world—and especially a legal world—containing social disagreement on 
large-scale issues. Stability would be difficult to obtain if fundamental disagreements 
broke out in every case of public or private dispute. In the nations of Eastern Europe, 
stable constitution-making has been possible only because the meaning of the document’s 
broad terms has not been specified in advance.  
 Second, incompletely theorized agreements can promote two goals of a 
constitutional democracy and a liberal legal system: to enable people to live together, and 
to permit them to show each other a measure of reciprocity and mutual respect. The use 
of low-level principles or rules allows judges on multimember bodies and perhaps even 
citizens generally to find a common way of life without producing unnecessary 
antagonism. Both rules and low-level principles make it unnecessary to resolve 
fundamental disagreements. At the same time, incompletely theorized agreements allow 
people to show each other a high degree of mutual respect, civility, reciprocity, or even 
charity. Frequently ordinary people disagree in some deep way on an issue—what to do 
in the Middle East, pornography, same-sex marriages, the war on terror—and sometimes 
they agree not to discuss that issue much, as a way of deferring to each other’s strong 
convictions and showing a measure of reciprocity and respect (even if they do not at all 
respect the particular conviction that is at stake). If reciprocity and mutual respect are 
14 
desirable, it follows that public officials or judges, perhaps even more than ordinary 
people, should not challenge their fellow citizens’ deepest and most defining 
commitments, at least if those commitments are reasonable and if there is no need for 
them to do so. Indeed, we can see a kind of political charity in the refusal to contest those 
commitments when life can proceed without any such contest. 
 To be sure, some fundamental commitments are appropriately challenged in the 
legal system or within other multimember bodies. Some such commitments are ruled off-
limits by the Constitution itself. Many provisions involving basic rights have this 
function. Of course it is not always disrespectful to disagree with someone in a 
fundamental way; on the contrary, such disagreements may sometimes reflect profound 
respect. When defining commitments are based on demonstrable errors of fact or logic, it 
is appropriate to contest them. So too when those commitments are rooted in a rejection 
of the basic dignity of all human beings, or when it is necessary to undertake the contest 
to resolve a genuine problem. But many cases can be resolved in an incompletely 
theorized way, and this is the ordinary stuff of constitutional law; that is what I am 
emphasizing here. 
 The third point is that for arbiters of social controversies, incompletely theorized 
agreements have the crucial function of reducing the political cost of enduring 
disagreements. If participants in constitutional law disavow large-scale theories, then 
losers in particular cases lose much less. They lose a decision, but not the world. They 
may win on another occasion. Their own theory has not been rejected or ruled 
inadmissible. When the authoritative rationale for the result is disconnected from abstract 
theories of the good or the right, the losers can submit to legal obligations, even if 
reluctantly, without being forced to renounce their largest ideals. 
 Fourth, and finally, incompletely theorized agreements are especially valuable 
when a society seeks moral evolution and even progress over time. Consider the area of 
equality, where considerable change has occurred in the past and will inevitably occur in 
the future. A completely theorized judgment would be unable to accommodate changes in 
facts or values. If a culture really did attain a theoretical end-state, it would become rigid 
and calcified; we would know what we thought about everything. Unless the complete 
theorization were error-free, this would disserve posterity. Hence incompletely theorized 
agreements are a key to debates over equality in both law and politics, with issues being 
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raised about whether discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, age, disability, and 
others are analogous to discrimination on the basis of race; such agreements have the 
important advantage of allowing a large degree of openness to new facts and 
perspectives.  
At one point, we might think that same-sex relations are akin to incest; at another 
point, we might find the analogy bizarre. Of course a completely theorized judgment 
would have many virtues if it is correct. But at any particular moment in time, this is an 
unlikely prospect for human beings, not excluding judges in constitutional disputes, or 
those entrusted with the task of creating constitutional provisions. 
 Compare practical reasoning in ordinary life. At a certain time, you may well 
refuse to make decisions that seem foundational in character—about, for example, 
whether to get married within the next year, or whether to have two, three, or four 
children, or whether to live in San Francisco or New York. Part of the reason for this 
refusal is knowledge that your understandings of both facts and values may well change. 
Indeed, your identity may itself change in important and relevant ways, and for this 
reason a set of firm commitments in advance—something like a fully theorized 
conception of your life course—would make no sense. Legal systems and nations are not 
altogether different.  
 
Burke and His Rationalist Adversaries 
 
Those who emphasize incompletely theorized agreements owe an evident debt to 
Edmund Burke, who was, in a sense, the great theorist of incomplete theorization. I do 
not attempt anything like an exegesis of Burke, an exceedingly complex figure, in this 
space, but let us turn briefly to Burke himself and in particular to his great essay on the 
French Revolution, in which he rejected the revolutionary temperament because of its 
theoretical ambition.
15
  
Burke’s key claim is that the “science of constructing a commonwealth, or 
reforming it, is, like every other experimental science, not to be taught a priori.”
16 To 
make this argument, Burke opposes theories and abstractions, developed by individual 
                                                 
15 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in The Portable Edmund Burke 416-451 (Isaac 
Kramnick ed. 1999). 
16 Id. at 442.  
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minds, to traditions, built up by many minds over long periods. In his most vivid passage, 
Burke writes:  
“The science of government being therefore so practical in itself, 
and intended for such practical purposes, a matter which requires 
experience, and even more experience than any person can gain in his 
whole life, however sagacious and observing he may be, it is with infinite 
caution than any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice 
which has answered in any tolerable degree, for ages the common 
purposes of society, or on building it up again, without having models and 
patterns of approved utility before his eyes.”
17
  
 
It is for this reason that Burke describes the “spirit of innovation” as “the result of 
a selfish temper and confined views,”18 and offers the term “prejudice” as one of 
enthusiastic approval, noting that “instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we 
cherish them to a very considerable degree.”19 Emphasizing the critical importance of 
stability, Burke adds a reference to “the evils of inconstancy and versatility, ten thousand 
times worse than those of obstinacy and the blindest prejudice.”
20
 Burke’s sharpest 
distinction, then, is between established practices and individual reason. He contends that 
reasonable citizens, aware of their own limitations, will effectively delegate decision-
making authority to their own traditions. “We are afraid to put men to live and trade each 
on his own private stock of reason,” simply “because we suspect that this stock in each 
man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general 
bank and capital of nations, and of ages. Many of our men of speculation, instead of 
exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom which 
prevails in them.”
21
  
 Burke was enthusiastic about reasoning by analogy, and it is easy to imagine an 
unambivalently Burkean advocate of incompletely theorized agreements. But Burke’s 
enthusiasm for traditions is contentious, and for good reason. In the aftermath of 
apartheid, should South Africa have built carefully, and in a tradition-bound way, on its 
own past? Or should it have adopted a constitution on the basis of some kind of account 
                                                 
17 Id. at 451. 
18 Id. at 428. 
19 Id. at 451. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
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of human liberty and equality? Social practices, and constitution-making, can be 
incompletely theorized while also being anti-Burkean. The South African Constitution 
itself includes stirring and tradition-rejecting ideals of various kinds, and those ideals can 
be accepted from many different foundations. In constitutional adjudication, judges who 
believe in incompletely theorized agreements might require government to come up with 
a reason for its practice—and insist that a tradition, or a longstanding practice, is not 
itself a reason.  
 In constitutional law, we can imagine fierce contests between Burkeans and their 
more rationalist adversaries, even if both camps are willing to march under the banner of 
incomplete theorization.
22
 Those contests cannot be resolved in the abstract; everything 
depends on the nature of the relevant traditions and the competence of those who propose 
to subject them to critical scrutiny. My central point is that Burkeans are committed to 
incompletely theorized agreements, but those who believe in such agreements need not 
be Burkeans. The American constitutional tradition generally requires reasons, even if 
low-level ones, and hence Burkeanism seems self-defeating for the United States, 
because it cannot easily be fit with American traditions. 
 
Conceptual Ascents for Constitutional Law? 
 
 Borrowing from Henry Sidgwick’s writings on ethical method,
23
 a critic of 
incompletely theorized agreements might respond that constitutional law should 
frequently use ambitious theories.
24
 For example, there is often good reason for people 
interested in constitutional rights to raise the level of abstraction and ultimately to resort 
to large-scale theory. Concrete judgments about particular cases can prove inadequate for 
morality or constitutional law. Sometimes people do not have clear intuitions about how 
cases should come out. Sometimes their intuitions are insufficiently reflective. 
Sometimes seemingly similar cases provoke different reactions, and it is necessary to 
raise the level of theoretical ambition to explain whether those different reactions are 
                                                 
22 For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 353 (2006). 
23See Henry Sidgwick. The Methods of Ethics. 7th ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1966), pp. 96-
104. 
24 This is the tendency in Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). 
18 
justified, or to show that the seemingly similar cases are different after all. Sometimes 
people simply disagree.  
By looking at broader principles, we may be able to mediate the disagreement. In 
any case there is a problem of explaining our considered judgments about particular 
cases, in order to see whether they are not just a product of accident or error. When 
modest judges joins an opinion that is incompletely theorized, they must rely on a reason 
or a principle, justifying one outcome rather than another. The opinion must itself refer to 
a reason or principle; it cannot just announce a victor. Perhaps the low-level principle is 
wrong, because it fails to fit with other cases, or because it is not defensible as a matter of 
(legally relevant) political morality. 
 In short, the incompletely theorized agreement may be nothing to celebrate. If a 
judge is reasoning well, he should have before him a range of other cases, C through Z, in 
which the principle is tested against others and refined. At least if he is a distinguished 
judge, he will experience a kind of “conceptual ascent,” in which the more or less 
isolated and small low-level principle is finally made part of a more general theory. 
Perhaps this would be a paralyzing task, and perhaps our judge need not often attempt it. 
But it is an appropriate model for understanding law and an appropriate aspiration for 
evaluating judicial and political outcomes. Judges who insist on staying at a low level of 
theoretical ambition are philistines, even ostriches. 
 There is some truth in this response. At least if they have time and competence, 
moral and constitutional reasoners thinking about basic rights should try to achieve 
vertical and horizontal consistency, not just the local pockets of coherence offered by 
incompletely theorized agreements. In democratic processes, it is appropriate and 
sometimes indispensable to challenge existing practice in abstract terms. But this 
challenge to incompletely theorized agreements, should not be taken for more than it is 
worth, for any interest in conceptual ascent must take account of the distinctive 
characteristics of the arena in which real-world constitutional-makers and judges must do 
their work. 
 As I have noted, incompletely theorized agreements have many virtues, including 
the promotion of stability, the reduction of costs of disagreement, and the demonstration 
of humility and mutual respect. All this can be critical to successful constitution-making 
in pluralistic society. The points bear on constitutional disputes as well. In a well-
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functioning constitutional democracy, judges are especially reluctant to invoke 
philosophical abstractions as a basis for invalidating the outcomes of electoral processes. 
They are reluctant because they know that they may misunderstand the relevant 
philosophical arguments, and they seek to show respect to the diverse citizens in their 
nation. A conceptual ascent might be appealing in the abstract, but if those who ascend 
will blunder, they might stay close to the ground. 
 There are many lurking questions. How, exactly, do moral and political 
judgments bear on the content of law in general and constitutional law? What is the 
relation between provisional or considered judgments about particulars and 
corresponding judgments about abstractions? Sometimes people interested in 
constitutional law write as if abstract theoretical judgments, or abstract theories, have a 
kind of reality and hardness that particular judgments lack, or if as abstract theories 
provide the answers to examination questions that particular judgments, frail as they are, 
may pass or fail. On this view, theories are searchlights that illuminate particular 
judgments and show them for what they really are. But we might think instead that there 
is no special magic in theories or abstractions, and that theories are simply the (humanly 
constructed) means by which people make sense of the judgments that constitute their 
ethical, legal, and political worlds. The abstract deserves no priority over the particular; 
neither should be treated as foundational. A (poor or crude) abstract theory may simply 
be a confused way of trying to make sense of our considered judgments about particular 
constitutional cases, which may be better than the theory.  
 
Incompletely Theorized Agreements and Disagreement 
 
 Incompletely theorized agreements have many virtues; but their virtues are 
partial. Stability, for example, is brought about by such agreements, and stability is 
usually desirable; but a constitutional system that is stable and unjust should probably be 
made less stable. Consider two qualifications to what has been said thus far. Some cases 
cannot be decided at all without introducing a fair amount in the way of theory. Some 
constitutional cases cannot be decided well without introducing more ambitious theory. If 
a good theory (involving, for example, the right to free speech) is available, and if judges 
can be persuaded that the theory is good, there should be no taboo on its judicial 
acceptance. Theoretical depth can hardly be rejected in the abstract. 
20 
 What of disagreement? The discussion thus far has focused on the need for 
convergence. There is indeed such a need; but it is only part of the picture. In law, as in 
politics, disagreement can be a productive and creative force, revealing error, showing 
gaps, moving discussion and results in good directions. The American constitutional 
order has placed a high premium on “government by discussion,” and when the process is 
working well, this is true for the judiciary as well as for other institutions. Agreements 
may be a product of coercion, subtle or not, or of a failure of imagination. 
 Constitutional disagreements have many legitimate sources. Two of these 
sources are especially important. First, people may share general commitments but 
disagree on particular outcomes. Second, people’s disagreements on general principles 
may produce disagreement over particular outcomes and low-level propositions as well. 
People who think that an autonomy principle accounts for freedom of speech may also 
think that the government cannot regulate truthful, nondeceptive commercial 
advertising—whereas people who think that freedom of speech is basically a democratic 
idea, and is focused on political speech, may have no interest in protecting commercial 
advertising at all. Constitutional theorizing can have a salutary function in part because it 
tests low-level principles by reference to more ambitious claims. Disagreements can be 
productive by virtue of this process of testing. 
 Certainly if everyone having a reasonable general view converges on a 
particular (by hypothesis reasonable) judgment, nothing is amiss. But if an agreement is 
incompletely theorized, there is a risk that everyone who participates in the agreement is 
mistaken, and hence that the outcome is mistaken. There is also a risk that someone who 
is reasonable has not participated, and that if that person were included, the agreement 
would break down. Over time, incompletely theorized agreements should be subject to 
scrutiny and critique, at least in democratic arenas, and sometimes in courtrooms as well. 
That process may result in more ambitious thinking than constitutional law ordinarily 
entails. 
 Nor is social consensus a consideration that outweighs everything else. Usually 
it would be much better to have a just outcome, rejected by many people, than an unjust 
outcome with which all or most agree. A just constitution is more important than an 
agreed-upon constitution. Consensus or agreement is important largely because of its 
connection with stability, itself a valuable but far from overriding social goal. As Thomas 
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Jefferson wrote, a degree of turbulence is productive in a democracy.
25
 It may well be 
right to make an unjust constitutional order a lot less stable. We have seen that 
incompletely theorized agreements, even if stable and broadly supported, may conceal or 
reflect injustice. Certainly agreements should be more fully theorized when the relevant 
theory is plainly right and people can be shown that it is right, or when the invocation of 
the theory is necessary to decide cases. None of this is inconsistent with what I have 
claimed here.  
 It would be foolish to say that no general theory about constitutional law or 
rights can produce agreement, even more foolish to deny that some general theories 
deserve support, and most foolish of all to say that incompletely theorized agreements 
warrant respect whatever their content. What seems plausible is something no less 
important for its modesty: except in unusual situations, and for multiple reasons, general 
theories are an unlikely foundation for constitutional-making and constitutional law, and 
for fallible human beings, caution and humility about theoretical claims are appropriate, 
at least when multiple theories can lead in the same direction. This more modest set of 
claims helps us to understand incompletely theorized agreements as important 
phenomena with their own special virtues. Such agreements help make constitutions and 
constitutional law possible, even within nations whose citizens disagree on many of the 
most fundamental matters.  
 Incompletely theorized agreements thus help illuminate an enduring 
constitutional and indeed social puzzle: how members of diverse societies can work 
together on terms of mutual respect amidst sharp disagreements about both the right and 
the good. If there is a solution to this puzzle, incompletely theorized agreements are a 
good place to start. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25Thus Jefferson said that turbulence is "productive of good. It prevents the degeneracy of government, 
and nourishes a general attention to . . . public affairs. I hold . . . that a little rebellion now and then is a 
good thing." Letter to Madison (Jan. 30, 1798), reprinted in The Portable Thomas Jefferson. Merrill D. 
Peterson ed. (New York: Viking Press, 1975).  
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